Automated authentication of a new network element

ABSTRACT

The technology presented herein enables a new network element to be authenticated to other network elements automatically. In a particular embodiment, a method provides determining a current time relative to a first time. The first time is known to the new network element and a provisioning network element. The method further provides generating first beacon data using seed data stored on the new network element and the current time and generating keying data using the first beacon data and identification information associated with the new network element. The method also provides identifying a first one-time pad (OTP) from the keying data and using the first OTP to encrypt an authentication request for transfer from the new network element to the provisioning network element.

TECHNICAL BACKGROUND

To ensure communications between networked elements, such as computingsystems and devices, remain secure, a network element must prove it isauthorized to communicate with another network element. Some common waysfor a network element to provide such proof is through encryptingcommunications with a key known only to authorized elements or using acertificate known only to authorized elements. When a network elementfirst comes online (e.g., first connected to the network or firstinitiated), the network element does not necessarily know the key orcertificate that needs to be used for communications. A user, such as anetwork administrator, may be able to provide the most up to date key orcertificate to the network element. However, such an arrangement may bedifficult in practice, especially in cases where many network elementsare continually being added to or removed from the network (e.g., as maybe the case when network elements are virtualized computing systemsand/or devices that can be instantiated and taken down based on demand).

Overview

The technology presented herein enables a new network element to beauthenticated to other network elements automatically. In a particularembodiment, a method provides determining a current time relative to afirst time. The first time is known to the new network element and aprovisioning network element. The method further provides generatingfirst beacon data using seed data stored on the new network element andthe current time and generating keying data using the first beacon dataand identification information associated with the new network element.The method also provides identifying a first one-time pad (OTP) from thekeying data and using the first OTP to encrypt an authentication requestfor transfer from the new network element to the provisioning networkelement.

In some examples, the method further provides receiving a first responseto the authentication request from the provisioning network element anddecrypting the first response using the first OTP to obtainauthentication information from the first response. In these examples,the method may further provide using the authentication information toauthenticate the new network element to a second network element.

In some examples, a seed file includes the seed data and the seed fileis present on the new network element when the new network element isfirst instantiated. In these examples, the seed file may be unique to anentity associated with the new network element.

In some examples, the method provides that generating the first beacondata using the seed data stored on the new network element and thecurrent time comprises inputting the seed data and the current time intoan Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm, which responsivelyoutputs the first beacon data.

In some examples, the method provides that identifying a first one-timepad (OTP) from the keying data comprises using an index to locate thefirst OTP from within the keying data.

In some examples, the method provides using a short-tag to authenticatethe keying data before using the first OTP to encrypt an authenticationrequest. In these examples, the method may further provide receiving theshort-tag in the new network element from a tag server on an out of bandchannel. The provisioning network element also receives the short-tag inthese examples.

In another example, an apparatus for a new network element is providedhaving one or more computer readable storage media and a processingsystem operatively coupled with the one or more computer readablestorage media. Program instructions stored on the one or more computerreadable storage media, when read and executed by the processing system,direct the processing system to determine a current time relative to afirst time. The first time is known to the new network element and aprovisioning network element. The program instructions further directthe processing system to generate first beacon data using seed datastored on the new network element and the current time and generatekeying data using the first beacon data and identification informationassociated with the new network element. The program instructions alsodirect the processing system to identify a first one-time pad (OTP) fromthe keying data and use the first OTP to encrypt an authenticationrequest for transfer from the new network element to the provisioningnetwork element.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 illustrates a network environment for automaticallyauthenticating a new network element.

FIG. 2 illustrates an operation of the network environment toautomatically authenticate a new network element.

FIG. 3 illustrates another network environment for automaticallyauthenticating a new network element.

FIG. 4 illustrates a scenario for the other network environment toautomatically authenticate a new network element.

FIG. 5 illustrates an operation for the other network environment toautomatically authenticate a new network element.

FIG. 6 illustrates a scenario for the other network environment toautomatically authenticate a new network element.

FIG. 7 illustrates a computing architecture to automaticallyauthenticate a new network element.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

When a new network element needs to authenticate itself, technologydescribed below allows the new network element to verify its credentialsfor authentication without a user needing to manually provide suchcredentials (e.g., an encryption key or certificate). In particular,using data known or available to both the new network element andanother, already authenticated network element, the new network elementis able to request information that will authenticate it to othernetwork elements during future communications (e.g., an encryption keyor certificate). If the request can be decoded by the other networkelement (without having to receive any other information from the newnetwork element), then it can be assumed with near 100% certainty thatthe new network element making the request is authorized to receive aresponse.

FIG. 1 illustrates network environment 100 for automaticallyauthenticating a new network element. Network environment 100 includesnew network element 101 and provisioning network element 102. Newnetwork element 101 and provisioning network element 102 communicateover communication link 111. Communication link 111 may be any type ofwired and/or wireless communication link and may include interveningsystems, networks, and devices.

In operation, new network element 101 may be any type of system ordevice having communication circuitry necessary to communicate with atleast provisioning network element 102 over communication link 111. Newnetwork element 101 may be a physical network element or may bevirtualized on a physical host computing system. For example, newnetwork element 101 may be a virtual machine instantiated on a host. Inorder to operate as desired, new network element 101 needs toauthenticate itself to one or more other network elements with which itwill be communicating. For instance, other network elements may providenetwork or application services that new network element 101 may accessover a communication network. These other network elements may havesecurity measures implemented that ensure only authenticated networkelements can make use of the features provided by the other networkelements (e.g., may require encryption or certificates). Provisioningnetwork element 102 exists to provide new network element 101 with theinformation necessary to comply with those security measures but firstnew network element 101 must authenticate itself to provisioning networkelement 102. Operation 200 is performed by both new network element 101and provisioning network element 102 to authenticate new network element101, as described below.

FIG. 2 illustrates operation 200 of network environment 100 toautomatically authenticate a new network element. New network element101 and provisioning network element 102 both determine a current timerelative to a designated reference time (201). Depending on the desiredlevel of granularity, the current time may comprise a number of minutes,seconds, milliseconds, or otherwise, from the designated time.Regardless of what time is chosen to be the designated reference timeknown to each element, the reference time must be the same for both newnetwork element 101 and provisioning network element 102 to ensureoperation 200 produces the same results at each element. In someexamples, new network element 101 may be associated with an entity, suchas a customer of a company providing the features that new networkelement 101 needs to access. In these examples, the reference time maybe unique to network elements associated with that entity to helpdifferentiate its authentication procedure from elements associated withanother entity that similarly perform operation 200. To ensure both newnetwork element 101 and provisioning network element 102 use the samecurrent time, the current time may be defined in windows of time (e.g.,five minute intervals) such that the current time is effectively thesame for anytime within a particular window.

New network element 101 and provisioning network element 102 generatebeacon data using seed data, which is stored on both new network element101 and provisioning network element 102 (202). The seed data is simplysome amount of random data (e.g., 128 KB of random 1s and 0s) but thatrandom data is the same on both new network element 101 and provisioningnetwork element 102. Like the reference time from above, the seed datamay be associated with and unique to an entity such that networkelements associated with other entities have other seed data unique toeach respective entity. The new network element 101 may be provided withthe seed data by a manufacturer of new network element 101, vendor ofnew network element 101, or other entity before beginning operation 200.If new network element 101 is a virtualized element, then a templateused to create new network element 101 on a host computing system mayinclude the seed data such that any network element instantiated usingthe template has the same seed data automatically. Any type ofencryption algorithm, or cryptographically secure pseudo-randomfunction, may be used to generate the beacon data. The seed data and thecurrent time are used as inputs into the algorithm. For instance, one ofthe seed data and the current time may be used as the data forencryption while the other may be used as the key. In some examples,data representing the current time may be input into the algorithmunaltered while other examples may input the current time afterperforming a derivation of some kind on the current time.

Keying data is then generated using the beacon data and identificationinformation associated with new network element 101 (203). The keyingdata is generated using an encryption algorithm with the beacon data anddata representing the identification information as inputs (e.g., onebeing the data and the other being the key). Any type of encryptionalgorithm, or cryptographically secure pseudo-random function, may beused to generate the keying data. The identification information may beany type of information that describes new network element 101, newnetwork element 101's relationship to provisioning network element 102(e.g., that new network element 101 is operated by a customer of aservice provider having provisioning network element 102), an entityassociated with new network element 101, or some other type of relevantinformation—including combinations thereof. For example, theidentification information may include a serial number of new networkelement 101, a universal unique identifier (UUID) for new networkelement 101, customer (i.e., entity) identifier, a tenant identifier,and/or some other type of information.

A one-time pad (OTP) is identified from the keying data (204). The OTPmay comprise the entirety of the keying data or may comprise a subset ofthe keying data. For example, the OTP may be a two byte subset of thekeying data and is identified within the keying data from an index(e.g., the index could indicate that the OTP begins 5 bytes from thestart of the keying data). The index may be manually provided to newnetwork element 101 and provisioning network element 102 (e.g., viainput from a user), may be included at manufacture, install, orinstantiation time, or may be provided to provisioning network element102 by other means.

Referring back to FIG. 1, new network element 101 uses the OTP toencrypt authentication request 131 using an OTP method of dataencryption. New network element 101 transfers authentication request 131to provisioning network element 102. Provisioning network element 102may not perform operation 200 until authentication request 131 isreceived or may have performed operation 200 beforehand. Regardless,since both new network element 101 and provisioning network element 102performed the exact same operation 200, the OTP resulting from operation200 is the same. Thus, provisioning network element 102 is able tosimply use the OTP to decrypt authentication request 131. If new networkelement 101 was not an authorized network element, then operation 200would result in a different OTP than provisioning network element 102'sperformance of operation 200 and provisioning network element 102 wouldnot be able to decrypt authentication request 131.

Since provisioning network element 102 is able to decrypt authenticationrequest 131 in this example, provisioning network element 102 recognizesnew network element 101 as an authorized network element and transfersauthentication response 132 in response to authentication request 131.Authentication response 132 includes any information, such as anencryption type identifier, encryption key, certificate, etc., that newnetwork element 101 may need to access other network elements associatedwith the authorization provided by provisioning network element 102.Authentication response 132 is encrypted using the same OTP determinedin operation 200 and, upon receipt, new network element 101 is able touse that OTP to decrypt authentication response 132 and extract theinformation therein.

Advantageously, information intended to remain secret, such as identityand encryption keys, are never sent nor communicated directly betweennew network element 101 and provisioning network element 102. Moreover,the implementation is highly scalable because of the true decoupling itprovides for multiple simultaneous authentication and authorization ofnew network element (i.e., authenticating other new network elements inaddition to new network element 101). This solves issues with largescale parallel transactions, such as those common inbusiness-to-consumer interactions.

FIG. 3 illustrates network environment 300 for automaticallyauthenticating a new network element. Network environment 300 includesnew network element 301, network element 302, network element 303,network element 304, provisioning server 305, short-tag server 306, andnetwork 307. Wired and/or wireless communication links connect each ofnew network element 301, network element 302, network element 303,network element 304, provisioning server 305, and short-tag server 306to network 307. Network 307 may comprise a single network or may be anetwork created from the combination of multiple networks, such as oneor more local area networks (LANs) and/or the Internet.

In operation, network element 302, network element 303, and networkelement 304 are associated with entity 351 and provide functionality forwhich new network element 301 will need to exchange communications. Forexample, network element 302, network element 303, and network element304 may be hosted by a company that provides services to variouscustomers of the company (e.g., entity 351 may be a customer of thecompany). New network element 301 may be a network element of entity 351that will need to communicate with one or more of network element 302,network element 303, and network element 304. For security reasons, newnetwork element 301 will need to be authenticated to network element302, network element 303, and network element 304. When new networkelement 301 first comes online, new network element 301 will not havethe information necessary to communicate with network element 302,network element 303, and network element 304. Providing new networkelement 301 with that necessary information needs to also be donesecurely so that other network elements that should not be able tocommunicate with network element 302, network element 303, and networkelement 304 cannot also obtain that information.

FIG. 4 illustrates scenario 400 for network environment 300 toautomatically authenticate a new network element. In scenario 400, newnetwork element 301 and provisioning server 305 both receive the sameshort-tag, short-tag 441, at step 1 from short-tag server 306. Short-tag441 is transferred over out of band links between new network element301 and provisioning server 305, respectively. New network element 301may request short-tag 441 from short-tag server 306 upon beinginstantiated or otherwise brought online. New network element 301 andprovisioning server 305 both perform operation 500 at step 2 in order togenerate keying data that can be authenticated using short-tag 441.

FIG. 5 illustrates operation 500 for network environment 300 toautomatically authenticate a new network element. In operation 500, seeddata 521 and current time 522 are used as input into an AdvancedEncryption Standard (AES) encryption algorithm, which outputs beacondata 523 using seed data 521 and current time 522. In this example, seeddata 521 associated with entity 351 is included in a seed file that isstored on new network element 301 before new network element 301 isbrought online to network 307. The seed file may be encrypted untilneeded for step 1 and then decrypted into memory, used for step 1, andthen closed out of memory. Provisioning server 305 has similarly storedthe seed file before operation 500 so that provisioning server 305 canauthenticate new network elements associated with entity 351, includingnew network element 301. Provisioning server 305 may store other seedfiles that have seed data associated with other entities sinceprovisioning server 305 may be used to authenticate new network elementsassociated with those entities in addition to those associated withentity 351. Also in this example, current time 522 comprises a 5 minuteblock of time in a sequence of 5 minute time blocks from a referencetime (other examples may use different block sizes). Using less preciseblocks of time to represent current time 522 greatly reduces thepossibility that new network element 301 and provisioning server 305will determine different current times due to factors like differencesin their local clocks or differences in when operation 500 is started.In some examples, the AES encryption algorithm may use the SP800-90Aderivation function to ensure strength of encryption irrespective ofseed data 521 and current time 522.

A key derivation is performed at step 2 on beacon data 523 andidentification information 524 using National Institute of Standards andTechnology Pseudorandom Functions (SP) 800-108. Identificationinformation 524 may include a serial number of new network element 301,a universal unique identifier (UUID) for new network element 301, acustomer identifier for entity 351, a tenant identifier, and/or someother type of information. The key derivation makes beacon data 523unique among other elements associated with entity 351 that may also berequesting authentication during the 5 minute period of current time 522using the same seed data 521 associated with entity 351. After beingsubject to the key derivation, beacon data 523 and identificationinformation 524 are then encrypted at step 3 using an encryptionalgorithm that outputs keying data 525 from the inputs. For example,AES-GCM (256 bit key) may be used because it provides authenticatedencryption and decryption, which provides validation. Keying data 525will be the same from both new network element 301 and provisioningserver 305 at the end of operation 500 since new network element 301 isproperly associated with entity 351. In this example, the encryption atstep 3 further outputs tag 526 which is data used for authenticatingkeying data 525, as discussed with respect to FIG. 6 below.

Referring back to scenario 400, once keying data 525 has been createdfrom operation 500, the OTP that should be used for encryptingauthentication request 431 is identified at step 3 from within the dataof keying data 525. The OTP is found from within keying data 525. Apredefined index may be used to identify the data representing the OTPfrom within keying data 525. The index may be a simple scalar offsetvalue that points to where in keying data 525 the OTP is located. Forexample, the index may point to a bit (or byte) as the starting point inkeying data 525 for the OTP and the OTP comprises the data that extendsfrom that starting point to a predefined data size. For added securityby reducing the likelihood that the index can be guessed, the index maybe a block, skip, and scalar offset within keying data 525.Authentication request 431 may be explicitly request authenticationinformation necessary for new network element 301 to communicate withnetwork element 302, network element 303, and network element 304 or themere fact that provisioning server 305 can decrypt new network element301 may imply that new network element 301 is requesting theauthentication information.

New network element 301 uses the OTP identified from keying data 525 toperform OTP encoding at step 4 on authentication request 431. Theencoded authentication request 431 is transferred at step 5 by newnetwork element 301 to provisioning server 305. Upon receivingauthentication request 431, provisioning server 305 uses the OTPidentified from keying data 525 to decode at step 6 the OTP encoding ofauthentication request 431. Given that provisioning server 305 candecode authentication request 431, provisioning server 305 can assumethat new network element 301 is authorized to receive the requestedauthentication information because it would be effectively impossiblefor a non-authorized device to have calculated or guessed the OTPidentified from keying data 525. Accordingly, provisioning server 305uses the OTP identified from keying data 525 to perform OTP encoding atstep 7 on authentication response 432. Encoded authentication response432 is transferred at step 8 by provisioning server 305 to new networkelement 301. New network element 301 decodes authentication response 432at step 9 using the OTP identified from keying data 525 to obtain theauthentication information therein.

Once the authentication information is obtained from authenticationresponse 432, new network element 301 can use the authenticationinformation to communicate with any one of network element 302, networkelement 303, and network element 304, which expect communicationstransferred in accordance with the authentication information. newnetwork element 301 is therefore able to begin communicating withnetwork element 302, network element 303, and network element 304without having to first exchange information that could be interceptedby a man in the middle attack or otherwise have to be manuallyprovisioned to new network element 301.

FIG. 6 illustrates scenario 600 for network environment 300 toautomatically authenticate a new network element. Scenario 600 is anexample of how short-tag 441 is used to authenticate the OTP used by newnetwork element 301 and provisioning server 305 in scenario 400 beforeexchanging authentication request 431 and authentication response 432using that the identified OTP. Authenticating that the OTP is correctbefore using the OTP to encode a message avoids the unnecessary use ofencoding/decoding resources at new network element 301 and provisioningserver 305 if the OTP is found to not be authentic.

In scenario 600, tag data 601 is identified at step 1 from tag 526. Insome cases, tag data 601 may comprise the entirety of tag 526 althoughonly a portion of tag 526 may be used for tag data 601. For example, inorder to keep the size of a short-tag down, only the first four and lastthree bytes of tag 526 may be used in tag data 601, which would resultin tag data 601 being 7 bytes in size. Tag data 601 is then compared atstep 2 to tag data 602 received in short-tag 441. If tag data 602matches tag data 601, keying data 525, and the OTP identified therefrom,is authentic and can be used by new network element 301 and provisioningserver 305 to exchange authentication request 431 and authenticationresponse 432.

Tag data 602 will match tag data 601 if short-tag server 306 generatedtag data 602 in the same way tag data 601 was generated for new networkelement 301 to authenticate itself to provisioning server 305. That is,short-tag server 306 performed operation 200 using the same inputsassociated with new network element 301 (i.e., the same seed data 521,current time 522, and identification information 524) to generate a tagfrom which tag data 602 is identified. As such, it would be verydifficult if not impossible for anything or anyone other than newnetwork element 301 and provisioning server 305 to have tag data thatmatches tag data 602.

Short-tag 441 includes index 603 in addition to tag data 602. Index 603comprises an indication of current time 522 since tag data 602 will onlyapply within current time 522 due to current time 522 being an input inoperation 500. Preferably, index 603 is an encrypted, or otherwisetransformed, version of current time 522 so that current time 522 cannotbe determined should short-tag 441 be intercepted by an unauthorizedsystem. If index 603 does not indicate current time 522, then acomparison between tag data 601 and tag data 602 will not result in amatch and need not even be performed. A new short-tag may need to berequested and/or new tag data 601 may need to be generated such that thetime indicated by the index is the same as the current time used tocreate the tag data. In one example, index 603 may comprise 2 bytes ofinformation that, when added to the 7 bytes of tag data 602 in theexample above results in short-tag 441 being 9 bytes in total.

FIG. 7 illustrates computing architecture 700 to automaticallyauthenticate a new network element. Computing architecture 700 is anexample computing architecture for new network element 101 and newnetwork element 301, although alternative configurations may also beused. Computing architecture 700 may similarly be an examplearchitecture for other elements described above, such as provisioningnetwork element 102, provisioning server 305, short-tag server 306, andnetwork elements 302-304, although alternative configurations may alsobe used. Computing architecture 700 comprises communication interface701, user interface 702, and processing system 703. Processing system703 is linked to communication interface 701 and user interface 702.Processing system 703 includes processing circuitry 705 and memorydevice 706 that stores operating software 707.

Communication interface 701 comprises components that communicate overcommunication links, such as network cards, ports, RF transceivers,processing circuitry and software, or some other communication devices.Communication interface 701 may be configured to communicate overmetallic, wireless, or optical links. Communication interface 701 may beconfigured to use TDM, IP, Ethernet, optical networking, wirelessprotocols, communication signaling, or some other communicationformat—including combinations thereof.

User interface 702 comprises components that interact with a user. Userinterface 702 may include a keyboard, display screen, mouse, touch pad,or some other user input/output apparatus. User interface 702 may beomitted in some examples.

Processing circuitry 705 comprises processing circuitry, such as amicroprocessor, and other circuitry that retrieves and executesoperating software 707 from memory device 706. Memory device 706comprises a computer readable storage medium, such as a disk drive,flash drive, data storage circuitry, or some other memory apparatus thatin no cases should be considered a mere propagated signal. Operatingsoftware 707 comprises computer programs, firmware, or some other formof machine-readable processing instructions. Operating software 707includes keying data module 708 and authentication request module 709.Operating software 707 may further include an operating system,utilities, drivers, network interfaces, applications, or some other typeof software. When executed by circuitry 705, operating software 707directs processing system 703 to operate computing architecture 700 asdescribed herein.

In particular, keying data module 708 directs processing system 703 todetermine a current time relative to a first time, wherein the firsttime is known to the new network element and a provisioning networkelement. keying data module 708 further directs processing system 703 togenerate first beacon data using seed data stored on the new networkelement and the current time and generate keying data using the firstbeacon data and identification information associated with the newnetwork element. Authentication request module 709 directs processingsystem 703 to identify a first one-time pad (OTP) from the keying dataand use the first OTP to encrypt an authentication request for transferfrom the new network element to the provisioning network element.

The descriptions and figures included herein depict specificimplementations of the claimed invention(s). For the purpose of teachinginventive principles, some conventional aspects have been simplified oromitted. In addition, some variations from these implementations may beappreciated that fall within the scope of the invention. It may also beappreciated that the features described above can be combined in variousways to form multiple implementations. As a result, the invention is notlimited to the specific implementations described above, but only by theclaims and their equivalents.

1. A method comprising: generating first encrypted data based, at leastin part, on first data stored on a first network element and a currenttime; generating second encrypted data and a first tag based, at leastin part, on the first encrypted data and identification information ofthe first network element; determining a first short tag from the firsttag, wherein the first short tag is a subset of the first tag; based onobtaining a second short tag, authenticating the second encrypted databased, at least in part, on the first short tag and the second shorttag; determining a one-time pad (OTP) key from the second encrypted datawhich has been authenticated; and encrypting an authentication requestfor transfer to a second network element with the OTP key.
 2. The methodof claim 1, further comprising determining the current time based, atleast in part, on a reference time, wherein the current time is relativeto the reference time, and wherein the reference time is maintained bythe first network element and the second network element.
 3. The methodof claim 1 further comprising comparing the first short tag and thesecond short tag and determining if the first short tag and the secondshort tag match, wherein authenticating the second encrypted datacomprises determining that the first short tag and the second short tagmatch.
 4. The method of claim 1, wherein obtaining the second short tagcomprises obtaining the second short tag on an out-of-band channel. 5.The method of claim 1 further comprising: determining if the currenttime is indicated in an index of the second short tag; based ondetermining that the current time is not indicated in the index of thesecond short tag, obtaining a third short tag; and authenticating thesecond encrypted data based, at least in part, on the first short tagand the third short tag.
 6. The method of claim 1, wherein generatingthe first encrypted data comprises generating the first encrypted datafrom the first data and the current time based, at least in part, on anencryption algorithm or cryptographically secure pseudo-random function.7. The method of claim 6, wherein generating the first encrypted datafrom the first data and the current time based, at least in part, on theencryption algorithm comprises using the first data as input data forthe encryption algorithm and the current time as a key or using thecurrent time as the input data and the first data as the key.
 8. Themethod of claim 1, wherein generating the second encrypted data and thefirst tag comprises generating the second encrypted data and the firsttag from the first encrypted data and the identification informationbased, at least in part, on an encryption algorithm or cryptographicallysecure pseudo-random function.
 9. The method of claim 8, whereingenerating the second encrypted data and the first tag from the firstencrypted data and the identification information based, at least inpart, on the encryption algorithm comprises using the first encrypteddata as input data for the encryption algorithm and the identificationinformation as a key or using the identification information as theinput data and the first encrypted data as the key, wherein the firsttag is an output of the encryption algorithm.
 10. One or morenon-transitory computer-readable media comprising program code to:generate first encrypted data based, at least in part, on first datastored on a first network element and a current time; generate secondencrypted data and a first tag based, at least in part, on the firstencrypted data and identification information of the first networkelement; determine a first short tag from the first tag, wherein thefirst short tag is a subset of the first tag; based on obtaining asecond short tag, authenticate the second encrypted data based, at leastin part, on the first short tag and the second short tag; determine aone-time pad (OTP) key from the second encrypted data which has beenauthenticated; and encrypt an authentication request for transfer to asecond network element with the OTP key.
 11. The non-transitorycomputer-readable media of claim 10, further comprising program code todetermine the current time based, at least in part, on a reference time,wherein the current time is relative to the reference time, and whereinthe reference time is maintained by the first network element and thesecond network element.
 12. The non-transitory computer-readable mediaof claim 10 further comprising program code to compare the first shorttag and the second short tag and determine whether the first short tagand the second short tag match, wherein the program code to authenticatethe second encrypted data comprises program code to determine that thefirst short tag and the second short tag match.
 13. The non-transitorycomputer-readable media of claim 10 further comprising program code to:determine whether the current time is indicated in an index of thesecond short tag; based on a determination that the current time is notindicated in the index of the second short tag, obtain a third shorttag; and authenticate the second encrypted data based, at least in part,on the first short tag and the third short tag.
 14. The non-transitorycomputer-readable media of claim 10, wherein the program code togenerate the first encrypted data comprises program code to generate thefirst encrypted data based, at least in part, on using the first data asinput data for an encryption algorithm and the current time as the keyor using the current time as the input data and the first data as thekey, and wherein the program code to generate the second encrypted dataand the first tag comprises program code to generate the secondencrypted data and the first tag based, at least in part, on using thefirst encrypted data as input data for an encryption algorithm and theidentification information as the key or using the identificationinformation as the input data and the first encrypted data as the key.15. A first network element comprising: a processor; and acomputer-readable medium having instructions stored thereon that areexecutable by the processor to cause the first network element to,generate first encrypted data based, at least in part, on first datastored on the first network element and a current time; generate secondencrypted data and a first tag based, at least in part, on the firstencrypted data and identification information of the first networkelement; determine a first short tag from the first tag, wherein thefirst short tag is a subset of the first tag; based on obtaining asecond short tag, authenticate the second encrypted data based, at leastin part, on the first short tag and the second short tag; determine aone-time pad (OTP) key from the second encrypted data which has beenauthenticated; and encrypt an authentication request for transfer to asecond network element with the OTP key.
 16. The first network elementof claim 15 further comprising instructions executable by the processorto cause the first network element to determine the current time based,at least in part, on a reference time, wherein the current time isrelative to the reference time, and wherein the reference time ismaintained by the first network element and the second network element.17. The first network element of claim 15 further comprisinginstructions executable by the processor to cause the first networkelement to compare the first short tag and the second short tag anddetermine if the first short tag and the second short tag match, whereinthe instructions executable by the processor to cause the first networkelement to authenticate the second encrypted data comprise instructionsexecutable by the processor to cause the first network element todetermine that the first short tag and the second short tag match. 18.The first network element of claim 15 further comprising instructionsexecutable by the processor to cause the first network element to:determine if the current time is indicated in an index of the secondshort tag; based on a determination that the current time is notindicated in the index of the second short tag, obtain a third shorttag; and authenticate the second encrypted data based, at least in part,on the first short tag and the third short tag.
 19. The first networkelement of claim 15, wherein the instructions executable by theprocessor to cause the first network element to obtain the second shorttag comprise instructions executable by the processor to cause the firstnetwork element to obtain the second short tag on an out-of-bandchannel.
 20. The first network element of claim 15, wherein theinstructions executable by the processor to cause the first networkelement to generate the first encrypted data comprise instructionsexecutable by the processor to cause the first network element togenerate the first encrypted data based, at least in part, on using thefirst data as input data for an encryption algorithm and the currenttime as a key or using the current time as the input data and the firstdata as the key, and wherein the instructions executable by theprocessor to cause the first network element to generate the secondencrypted data and the first tag comprise instructions executable by theprocessor to cause the first network element to generate the secondencrypted data and the first tag based, at least in part, on using thefirst encrypted data as input data for an encryption algorithm and theidentification information as a key or using the identificationinformation as the input data and the first encrypted data as the key.